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Warrant Economics, Call-Put Policy Options and the 
Fallacies of Economic Theory 
 
In this paper we aim to trace the roots of the ongoing economic mayhem and to unmask the 
chorus of the tragedy which plays on the world stage. The main thesis of our work is that, 
despite the triumphant rhetoric praising the merits of perfect competition, the global fields of 
the dysfunctional market system have mushroomed in what we call Warrant Economics for 
the Free-Market Aristocracy. Warrant Economics unfolds in two symbiotic tenets that 
constitute the subtle architecture of the neoliberal edifice: (i) the systemic creation and 
preservation of inequality via Call-Put policy options, and (ii) the systemic exploitation of 
inequality via novel and toxic forms of securitisation. In effect, the power structure of insiders’ 
capitalism that we describe, trough the costless appropriation of an intricate cobweb of Call-
Put structures, has distorted competition and accelerated economic concentration. We view 
the income distribution effect, which favours the top 1%, and the business concentration 
effect, which gravitates competition towards oligopolistic/monopolistic industries, as the two 
sides of the Warrant Economics coin. We argue that the Warrant Economics state of 
capitalism has been legitimised by a degenerating research programme blossomed under the 
fallacy that economics is the “physics of society”. In this faculty of thought, we perceive the 
Great Recession as a symptom of Warrant Economics, rather than as a tsunami-like event. 
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 1 Introduction
Is it another long-lasting nightmare? Did noble dreams of prosperity for all, insulated
we were vehemently told from boom to bust cycles, unexpectedly crash landed? How
is it ever possible that the vessel of the "miracle economy" with the "dream team" of
skippers at its helm delivered such a frightening cargo, the Great Recession? Forensic
examination carried out during the apocalyptic 2007-present period has identiﬁed the
following interwoven features of our turbulent epoche.
First, Globalisation, the high promise - bitter disappointment enterprise. This political
and economic mega trend of the past three decades, nourished by FIAT money and
through the dominance of the US dollar as the international reserve currency, has resulted
in global imbalances with persistent surplus and deﬁcit countries. The legitimate reaction
of South East Asian sovereigns to the barbarous and humiliating IMF policies, in the
opinion of many, during the 1997 Asian crisis made reserve accumulation (mainly in
the form of US Treasury Bills) an insurance against the ﬂight of hot currency from their
opened-up dominions. Crucially, the market based gradual structural reforms that started
in the late 1970s, have transformed China in the new millennium to a global superpower
and the world’s largest creditor (the mercantilist approach for the parity of the renminbi
against the US dollar is instrumental to the cause). The massive reserve hoarding by the
Asian nations triggered an industry of reserve recycling by the US Fed and other central
bankers enabling them to run cheap FIAT money policies and fuel an unsustainable asset
and consumption boom.1
Second, the escalating deregulation of ﬁnancial services/capital markets orchestrated
by central bankers, regulators and neoliberal political administrations guided by the ‘Mae-
stro’, the ‘Oracle’, aka Mr. Alan Greenspan.
Third, the unregulated proliferation of toxic and opaque synthetic assets, wrapped up
in shining gloss, by the sect of gung-ho bankers operating in ghettos of greed and overlever-
age. Such ﬁnancial structures were (i) poorly understood by their widespread recipients,
(ii) implausibly highly rated by the cartel of rating agencies, and (iii) incompetently risk
managed by their creators.
True may be, but such utterance oﬀers only a light touch explanation for the deeper
causes of the post-2007 subprime blues, the ﬁnancial meltdown after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the unfolding of the worst economic crisis since
1Under a Gold standard, reserve accumulation in gold rather than US Treasuries (e.g. by China,
equivalent to more than 2.5 trillion dollars in US T-bill issuances) would have been deﬂationary,
since it would drain the world of liquidity and force the US Fed to raise interest rates. In con-
trast, under FIAT, the US dollar has been hotter and hotter in the pumps of printing ever since
the 1970s. The currency component of M1 was increasing by around 6 billion per annum during
the 1970s, 11.8 in the 1980s, 30.1 in the 1990s, 33.7 in the 2000s, and 58.3 from 1/2010 to 1/2011.
See the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ graph of the currency component of M1 (CURRSL) at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=CURRSL#
2the 1930s. Four years on and questions are still looming large. What is the eﬃcacy of the
Armageddon of bailout plans instigated by policy makers (and predominantly funded by
the taxpayer) to rescue at any cost ﬁnancial institutions deemed as ‘too big to fail’? Who
are the main beneﬁciaries of the unorthodox monetary policies such as quantitative eas-
ing (i.e. printing of ﬁat money to twist the yield curve)? The fragile recovery of 2009/10
and the massive proﬁts of banks and big corporations oﬀered a scintilla of hope that the
unprecedented ﬁscal and monetary interventions could put the global economy back on a
sustainable growth path. Banks were expected to honour their side of the deal; the society
had bailed them out and, in turn, they were presumed to bail out the economy through
lending. This early euphoria though was premature. Growth in the western developed
economies is proving more anaemic than it was originally thought, and unemployment is
high and persistent; banks are hoarding proﬁts, and lending to households and small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is drying up once more, or is available under punitive
interest rates; and big corporations are piling up cash instead of engaging in productive
investments.
In 2011, the private sector crisis is transformed into a public sector crisis. Under
the pretence of short-term ﬁscal consolidation, many indebted western sovereigns are
introducing self-defeating draconian austerity programmes (unless one believes in the
eﬀectiveness of an "expansionary ﬁscal contraction", quite an oxymoron). Such an agenda
is (i) preemptively instigated in the UK, and to a lesser extent in France, guided by
ideological conviction to preserve the elusive AAA rating, (ii) aiming to pacify the threat,
made by the opportunistic and amorphous mass of bond vigilantes for a private market
credit shutdown in Spain and Italy, and (iii) a brutal necessity, reminiscent of East Asia
in 1997, demanded by the troika (EU/ECB/IMF) in exchange of direct loans to the
eurozone peripheral countries - Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. At the same time the
balance sheets of big banks are turning up to be far more toxic than the recent stress tests
made us to believe and further recapitalisation (especially for the ﬁnancial institutions of
the Eurozone) is needed. The banking industry seems as dysfunctional now as it was at
the heights of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. So what is going on?
In this paper we aim to trace the roots of the ongoing economic mayhem and to unmask
the main chorus of the tragedy which currently plays on the world stage. This is neither an
act of schadenfreude nor an attempt to stockpile facts and arguments for radical advocacy.
Rather, it is an endeavour to unravel the riddles of the current economic predicaments
nourished by a powerful consensus in economics and ﬁnance. An academic orthodoxy
which, with unparalleled eﬀrontery, compiled a system of non falsiﬁable "theories" and
trumpeted it as immortal wisdom.
Prominent examples are the general equilibrium (GE) theory (and its recent incarna-
tion of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models) together with the ﬁrst and second
3welfare theorems, the eﬃcient market hypothesis, the natural rate of unemployment, all
distinct yet inextricably related dogmas marketing an aura of rigour and unquestion-
able scientiﬁcp u r p o s e . 2 Since the 1960s, the dominant paradigm that rules the roost of
economics and (since the early 1980s) economic policy itself, asserts with doctrinaire con-
viction that unrealistic microeconomic foundations should dictate macroeconomics and
ﬁnance. Elegant axiomatic mathematical modelling of the self-regarding behaviour of a
representative, rational and eternally utility - an overloaded term that enshrouds mo-
tives, behaviour and wellbeing - proﬁt maximising economic agent, void of any cognitive
limitations, draws the only possible and acceptable magna carta of legitimate economic
theorising (satisfying the self-referential criteria of the academic status quo).
Such faculty of thought, grounded upon a ﬁctitious organism, nulliﬁes the organic
complexity of the economic social frame and the plasticity of the brain of its participants.
In what follows, we reﬂect upon this ludicrous epistemology, which has become the lex
naturalis of economic science.3
The main thesis of our work is that despite the triumphant rhetoric praising the
merits of competition and unfettered capitalism, the global ﬁelds of the twisted laissez-
faire economics have mushroomed in what we call Warrant Economics for the Free-Market
Aristocracy. Warrant Economics stands as a synopsis of the regressive state of capitalism
and the degenerating consensus of economic enquiry. In this vein, the Great Recession
should be understood as a symptom rather than as an unpredictable statistical rarity that
professional elites are preaching.
Warrant Economics puts into oblivion the classical marginal productivity theory, ac-
cording to which, the distribution of income and wealth (excluding rentier income from
intergenerational transfers of assets) mirrors an individual’s incremental contribution to
the value of goods and services. It breaks with the principle of a ‘just reward’ in a truly
competitive enterprise economy, where remuneration is based predominantly upon eﬀort,
talent, entrepreneurship, innovation, and risk taking. Our analysis of Warrant Economics
oﬀers a novel and factual introspection about the formation of Power and the systemic
excesses in our age of ‘free-market feudalism’. In our work, we state succinctly that the
income distribution eﬀect that favours the top 1%, and the business concentration eﬀect
that gravitates competition towards oligopolistic/monopolistic units of production (even
for ﬁrms and industries spawned by new technologies) are the two sides of the Warrant
Economics coin.
2Blaug (1992, ch. 8), under the Popperian falsiﬁcation perspective, argues conclusively against the
acolade "theory" and carries on to observe that “The claims that GE theory is merely making precise
an economic tradition that is as old as Adam Smith, thus enabling us to show just why Pareto optimal,
competitive equilibrium may never actually materialise, is a historical travesty” (p.163).
3In our thesis we abstain from ongoing developments in behavioural and evolutionary economics which,
although may oﬀer a strong claim to legitimacy, are not assimilated in the dominant economic paradigm
that we peruse.
4Speciﬁcally, the framework of Warrant Economics illuminates the selective and dis-
tortive contractual appropriation of the residual claimancy rights stemming from the own-
ership and utilisation of resources and production processes. This is elaborated in Section
2, where we expose the systemic creation, preservation and exploitation of inequality via
Call-Put institutional policy options. Section 3 draws on the erroneous travails to portray
economics as the physics of society. It reﬂects on the fallacies of the axiomatic, ultra
deductive, formalist approach in economics that made the latter a utopian science. A
science that is disassociated from observable reality and has been blinded by a ferocious
insistence upon monolithic representations of the processes of choices and actions that
human players and their institutions open up for non partisan investigation. Through the
lens of Warrant Economics, Section 4 traces the key intellectual footprints in the develop-
ment of the dominant economic paradigm and unwinds the segregated discourse between
rhetoric and reality. It conveys an apt verdict on the devious dialectic in the neoliberal
strand between a conspicuous apathy towards the real state of capitalism and the fero-
cious attempts to legitimize the necessity of global monopolies. Section 5 deliberates the
sovereign debt crisis. It identiﬁes a private-public-academic (PPA) partnership that is
formed to ringfence the preservation of Warrant Economics in an era where the renewed
problems of economic and ﬁnancial instability are looming large in the world. Section 6
concludes.
2 Warrant Economics
During the last thirty years the political establishment, having the blessings of the dom-
inant school of economic "theorists", originated and gradually institutionalised a pro-
foundly inequitable, unstable and prone to systemic crisis form of market economics: the
Warrant Economics for the Free-Market Aristocracy. The term Warrant is used here to
denote options (i.e. rights) on a sovereign’s current and, most importantly, future wealth,
implicitly issued by the state itself.4
Since the roaring 1990s and up to the beginning of the current doom-laden epoch, the
Washington consensus has been preaching the superiority of their policies for the social
welfare under the holy trinity of low inﬂation, phenomenal and sustainable growth, and
relatively low unemployment. Euphemisms like ‘the Nice’, or even bolder, ‘the Fabulous
Decade’, ‘the Great Moderation’ and ‘Goldilocks Economy - not too hot and not too
cold, but just right’, widely used since the mid 1990s, led to two concomitant develop-
ments. First, the fencing of the masterly engineered cocoon of public illusion for material
prosperity for all and, second, the concealment of the destructive distributional eﬀects of
4The textbook deﬁnition of Warrant is an option on the ﬁrm’s stock issued by the ﬁrm to its managers
and stockholders.
5W a r r a n tE c o n o m i c so nt h es h a p eo ft h em a r k e te c o n o m y . T h ew o r d so ft h ei n ﬂuential
social analyst of the mercantilist early eighteenth century, Bernard Mandeville, echo the
consequences of the twenty ﬁrst century Warrant Economics: “...in a Free Nation where
Slaves are not allow’d of... To make the Society happy..., it is requisite that great numbers
of them should be Ignorant as well as Poor” (Mandeville, [1728]2010, p.328).
• We argue that Warrant Economics unfolds in two symbiotic tenets that consti-
tute the subtle architecture of the neoliberal ediﬁce: (i) the systemic creation and
preservation of inequality via Call-Put policies, and (ii) the systemic exploitation of
inequality via novel and toxic forms of securitisation.
An enduring concomitant aspect of Warrant Economics is the institutional allocation
of power to an economic elite. This is in stark contrast to the heritage of true liberalism
propagated in the work of Simons5 ([1934]1948), who pinpointed that “An important
factor in existing inequality, both of income and of power, is the gigantic corporation. We
may recognize, in the almost unlimited grants of powers to corporate bodies, one of the
greatest sins of governments against the free-enterprise system.” (ib., p.52)
Here we follow the deﬁnition of power given by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p.75).
“Power is participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to
the values K if G participates in the making of decisions aﬀecting the K-policies of H”,
together with the necessity of threats and use of sanctions “to sustain a policy against
opposition” (ib., p.76). We assert that, whereas the agents in group G typically refer to
the owners and suppliers of capital inputs (and H to the labourers), Warrant Economics
has distorted this pure capitalist cause. The Call-Put policies (analysed below) have been
redeﬁning the composition of the G and H groups and have further skewed both the
allocation of control of the production process and the distribution of claimancy rights on
the economic surplus. We argue that the majority of the productive and organic tissue of
the society is relegated to a passive, exploited, and deprived participant in the bespoke
power game of the aristocracy of Warrant Economics. In the light of the growing public
disquiet about the functioning of the market system, our work could serve as a blueprint
for explaining the seeds of the Great Recession and as such allow the 99% movement to
possess an intellectual compass.
2.1 The Systemic Creation and Preservation of Inequality
In its ﬁrst phase, Warrant Economics unfolds by the creation of Call and Put policy
options, implicitly written by the neoliberal state and its symbiotic economic institutions,
which, in turn, are distributed for free to the noble family of the modern market kingdom:
5Dubbed as the Crown Prince of the Chicago School by Stigler (1974).
6ﬁnancial institutions and big multinationals.6 Warrant Economics is the profound example
of the recently much maligned ‘Originate and Distribute’ model of ﬁnancial engineering;
through its practice, the neoliberal consensus ensures that the wealthy top 1 percent (or
even less) has an institutional right to milk the sacred cow of global growth in a privileged
way. We view the adverse concentration eﬀects in market competition and distribution
eﬀects for incomes as the two sides of the Warrant Economics coin.
2.1.1 The Institutional Power of the Call
The Call option oﬀers unlimited upside wealth potential over and above a rolling strike
price (in ﬁnancial engineering terms, a cliquet or ratchet contingent claim that resets the
strike of the derivative structure to the last ﬁxing of the underlying asset) determined by
the nominal income of those at the bottom 99 per cent of the distribution. This exercise
price may be adjusted (highly contentious in the present age of austerity) by expected
inﬂation and a positive (albeit small) growth rate; the latter ensures economic stability
according to theorists - in our opinion, it merely preserves the Warrants status quo.
We outline forthwith key policies that shape the architecture of the global market
landscape and engineer the perpetual in-the-moneyness of the call options for the golden
few.
1. Favourable regulatory/tax policies, exploitation of regulatory/tax arbitrage, and
the existence of tax havens (most of them operating under the British Crown’s
jurisdiction).
2. Freeing of capital movements, deregulation of global capital markets, and openness
of the ﬁnancial sectors of emerging and developing economies.
3. Privatisation of natural resources irrespective of the ensuing costs of environmental
damage and natural resource depletion.
4. Flexible labour markets that lead to outsourcing and herald the dominance of the
"worst employer" in the most proﬁtable "social haven". This has been reinforced
by the collapse of the Soviet Union releasing hundreds of millions of new workers in
the world economy, thus creating a global reserve army of labour. The end result
is imported (in developed economies) downward pressure on the combined wage,
direct and indirect (the latter, in the form of depleted employment rights, social
beneﬁts and related state provisions).
6Neoliberal, in the sense that the embracing of a market economy has eﬀectively become synonymous to
serving the interests of big business. We should also point out that, in the context of Warrant Economics,
Call-Put policies feed ‘ﬁnancialisation’, a term referring to the engagement of non ﬁnancial businesses in
ﬁnancial markets (Stockhammer, 2004).
75. ‘One model ﬁts all’ economic policy prescriptions - i.e. slashing of public spending,
open and ﬂexible markets - that the IMF’s dogmatic thinktank systematically im-
poses on countries with borrowing needs. The two other bodies with global reach,
namely the WTO and the World Bank, act as complementary custodians of the Call
Option’s privileges.
In short, in the name of globalisation, liberisation of capital markets, structural reform
and ﬂexibility in the labour markets, Call policies have triggered a competitive arms race
on a global scale to maximise tax, social, and ecological dumping with exponential returns
to their holders.
Statistics speak volumes. “Between 2000 and 2006 the US economy expanded by
18 per cent, whereas real income for the median working class dropped by 1.1 per cent
... Meanwhile, the top tenth saw an improvement of 32 per cent in their incomes, the
top 1 per cent a rise of 203 per cent the top 0.1 per cent a staggering gain of 425 per
cent” (Financial Times, 2008, October 29). Economists of the Washington consensus have
labelled such a wealth redistribution ‘median wage stagnation’ and are stunned about the
complexity of the problem and its causes. Others dub it the ‘silent recession’. While the
real income for the poorest 20% of the US population was decreasing by an annual rate
of 0.7% over the 2000-2007 period (US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 2008, June
26), George W. Bush joked “This is an impressive crowd. The haves and the have-mores.
Some people call you the elite. I call you my base” during the 2000 Alfred E. Smith
Memorial Foundation Dinner (this is an annual charity fundraiser for Catholic Charities).
Piketty and Saez (2006) examine the evolution of incomes in the US from 1917 to
2002, and ﬁnd that the overall pattern of top income shares over the century is U-shaped.
In particular, the top percentile ﬂuctuated “from about 18% before WWI, to only about
8% in the 1960s and 1970s, and back to almost 17% by 2000” (ib., p.201), reaching 18.3%
in 2007 (Alvaredo et al., 2011). The rise in income inequality is further documented by
Wolﬀ and Zacharias (2006) who show that, over the 1982-2000 period, the share of the
top percentile increased from 9.9% to a staggering 17.4%, using the standard measure of
money income, or from 14.1% to 20.1% when the authors use their measure of wealth
adjusted income.
The Financial Times (2010, July 30) point out that “the annual incomes of the bottom
90 per cent of US families have been essentially ﬂat since 1973 — having risen by only 10
per cent in real terms over the past 37 years. ...Over the same period the incomes of the
top 1 per cent have tripled.” We should note that, although the increase in the share of
the top percentile has been accompanied by the exceptional growth in top executives’ pay
relative to the salaries of employees, the issue of whether the so called ‘working rich’ have
replaced top capital owners (the ‘rentiers’) at the top of the economic ladder is beyond
8the scope of this essay.7
Nevertheless, the report in the Financial Times (2010, February 3) is quite informative:
“A packed session at the World Economic Forum in Davos last week addressed the issue
of executive compensation and the huge rise in the pay gap between chief executives and
ordinary workers in their organisations. ...The best-paid person in a US company was paid
about 40 times that of the worst-paid person a generation ago. Now the multiple is about
300. ...Asked whether the reason was that management had improved hugely; executives
were underpaid in the past; their jobs were more onerous today, or whether executives
had collectively exploited market power to raise their salaries, all of the members of the
panel agreed that the last possibility was closest to the truth.”
Interestingly, the current situation parallels the ‘gilded age’ of the 1920s that gave rise
to unprecedented Great Gatsby-style incomes at the top and was brought to an end by
the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression. Saez (2010) shows that
for the US, the distribution of income today almost matches that of 1928 on the eve of
the Wall Street crash. In 1928, the top 1 percent of Americans took in 24 per cent of
national income compared with 23.5 per cent in 2007 and 20.9 percent in 2008 (ib., Figure
2). More disturbing is the observation that the income share of the top 0.01% in 2008
was 5 percent, a level only achieved in 1928. Notably, since then, this share had been
trending downwards until 1978 when it had reached 1 percent (ib., Figure 3).
In the era of globalisation, it is of no surprise that the inequality developments in the
US are mirrored in the rest of the world. Edward (2006) uses density and growth curves
to oﬀer a holistic analysis of global poverty, growth, and inequality. His results show that
the bottom 50% of the world’s population received less than 10% of the global growth in
the 1990s.8 According to Llense (2010, p.1) “the sharp increase in globalization and the
last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France.”
In Japan, traditionally considered as an egalitarian society, inequality has been rising
since the eighties. Moriguchi (2010, p.7) links this increase “with a faster growth of wage
income at the high end of the distribution” but notes (p.23) that the recent increases in
the top 1% wage group are modest when compared to those in the US. Gustafsson and
Jansson (2008) show that the top of the income distribution in Sweden has developed more
favourably than for other groups since the eighties, with the highest centile experiencing
the most rapid increase. In Germany, Biewen and Juhasz (2010) argue that from 2000 to
2006 there was an unprecedented rise in net equivalised income inequality and poverty.
7For example, Wolﬀ and Zacharias (2006) do not support this issue, whereas Piketty and Saez (2006)
argue in its favour. Although “Forbes popularised the term ‘working rich’, the magazine used it in the
sense that the wealthiest Americans hold jobs rather than in the sense that the wealthiest depend mainly
on labour income as their chief source of income” (Wolﬀ and Zacharias, 2006, p.12).
8It should also be noted that “Middle-income earners (outside China) had the lowest relative con-
sumption growth. For the roughly one billion people between the 50th and 70th percentiles, consumption
hardly changed from 1993 to 2001” (ib., p.1682).
9Regarding the rich-poor divide in the UK, it is wider now than 40 years ago according
to the report of the National Equality Panel: An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in
the UK, January 2010.9 Strikingly, the share of the top 1% of the income distribution
decreased from around 17% before WWII to around 6% in the second half of the 1970s,
and regressed to 14.6% by 2007 (Alvaredo et al., 2011). We further read in the Financial
Times (2011, May 13): “In 1979 a person in the top 1 per cent of earners would have
had income three times that of the median person. The income multiple had risen to 4.4
times by 1996-97 and then to 5.6 times by 2009-10.” The high pay commission, set up in
November 2010 to scrutinise the rising pay of those at the top of thep u b l i ca n dp r i v a t e
sectors reported that, while over the 1949-1979 period the share of income going to the
top of the distribution had been dropping, today the top 0.1% of earners take home as big
a percentage of the national income as they did in the 1940s. The High Pay Commission
(2011, p.6) further claims that “If current trends continue... we will have gone back to
levels of inequality not seen since Victorian England.”
In this light, we cannot agree more with the point made by Bowles and Gintis (2000,
p.1434) “in the opening pages of his Principles, Marshall deﬁned one of the chief tasks of
o u rd i s c i p l i n et h i sw a y :Now at last we are setting ourselves seriously to inquire whether it
is necessary that there should be any so called ‘lower classes’ at all ... the answer depends
in a great measure upon facts and inferences, which are within the province of economics;
and it is this which gives to economic studies their chief and their highest interest. We
suspect he would be disappointed in what economics has accomplished toward this end
over the intervening century, ... throughout the world.”
• In our view, the escalating income inequality is a symptom of Call policies. It is
very well known in ﬁnance that the beneﬁc i a r i e s( t o p1p e rc e n to fi n c o m ee a r n e r s
and, even more emphatically the top 0.1 percentile) of in-the-money warrants dilute
the claim of incumbent shareholders (bottom 99 per cent of income earners) of the
company (national wealth).
Another major destabilising consequence of Call policies is the reduction of the share
of wages and salaries of a country’s GNP (or GDP), and the accompanying increase in
proﬁts. For the US alone, the share of wages and salaries in the annual GNP went down
from 54.9% in 2000 to its lowest level since 1929, 51.6% in 2006 (Aron-Dine and Shapiro,
2007). Notably, during the 2001-06 expansion, while wages and salaries grew at a 1.9
percent average annual rate (after adjusting for inﬂation), corporate proﬁts increased by
12.8% (ib., p.1). According to The Economist (2006, June 17th), since2 0 0 0“ T h ef r u i t so f
productivity gains have been skewed towards the highest earners, and towards companies,
9See also the Joseph Rowntree Foundation “New poverty and wealth maps of Britain reveal inequality
to be at 40-year high”, 17 July 2007, www.jrf.org.uk
10whose proﬁts have reached record levels as a share of GDP.” Up to the unveiling of the
crisis in 2007, such developments have typically led to either overinvestment by businesses
or a shortfall in aggregate demand. When wages trail productivity,10 spending can keep
up with output only by the expansion of consumer debt. In the US, the ratio of household
debt to GDP jumped from 75% in 2000 to 104% in 2007 (BIS, 2009), providing golden
opportunities for the exploitation of inequality by reputed holders of Warrants, as we shall
unwind in the second facet of Warrant Economics in the following section. For example,
“The Fortune 500 largest U.S. companies slashed a record 821,000 jobs last year, even as
their collective proﬁt soared more than three-fold to $391 billion, according to the business
magazine” (Reuters, April 15 2010, ‘Fortune 500 shed record 821,000 jobs in 2009’ by Phil
Wahba).
• With the uncovering of the function of Call policies, the adage ‘we spend more than
we produce’, used by goverments to justify the recent austerity debacle, represents
the insult after the injury to the bottom 99 percent of the public.
2.1.2 The Institutional Power of the Put
The Put option provides limited downside loss for large and systemically important ﬁrms
(predominantly, systemically important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs).11 In its primary
form, it is struck at the worth of the distressed/insolvent or substantially undercapitalised
institution and, typically, protects the rights of creditors. The payoﬀ to the holders of the
Put is the cost to the general public of the state funded rescue or bailout plan(s).12
For the ﬁnancial system in particular, secondary Put beneﬁts include (i) deposit guar-
antees which, for ﬁnancial conglomerates, fund the overleverage of their investing arms,
and (ii) periodic capital injections, or even the purchase of ‘bad assets’ by the state at
strike prices well above market values. Thus, the provision of the Put eﬀectively pro-
claims: no matter at what cost, funded by the taxpayer, you are too big to fail, even if
10It is important to say that the labour income share, seen in the light of the wage-productivity










i.e. the labour share can be expressed as the ratio of average real wage and productivity. If, say, a 10%
productivity gain is accompanied by a 10% growth in the average real wage, then the wage gap is zero.
On the other hand, the lower the wage growth, the more wages trail productivity gains and thus the
higher is the wage gap.
11We do not claim originality of the term. ‘Greenspan’s Put’ refers to the salvation plans of the Fed’s
Chairman after the collapse of the giant hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the
cushioning of bankers from the fatal excesses of their practices ever since.
12There is an important diﬀerence between ﬁnancial bailouts and sovereign "bailouts". “These oﬃcial
‘bailout packages’ consist of interest bearing loans which in eﬀect replace maturing private debt; if grants
were given instead, this would be an entirely diﬀerent story as it would lower government indebtedness
and hence risk” (Chamley and Pinto, 2011, p.1).
11you are a zombie bank. Besides the obvious creation of moral hazard, another immediate
and severely destabilising eﬀect of the Put option is the dominance of the highest risk
taker, safeguarded by ‘heads-I-win, tails-you-loose’ type of Put Warrants. As a conse-
quence, risk management is degraded to a mere cost function, serving as a compulsory
(albeit detached) monitoring unit which can only restrain proﬁtable business.
The unprecedented socialisation of a ﬁrm’s own internal systemic risks via (partial or
full) nationalisation of ﬁnancial institutions such as AIG, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Fredie
Mac, Fortis, Lloyds, Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (the list is far from exhaus-
tive) has evidenced another dire aspect of the ‘reward for failure’ that the Put underwrites.
As we read in the Financial Times (2009, March 3), “Vikram Pandit, Citigroup’s chief
executive, poses the issue in stark terms. When the U.S. government announced further
support, he was reported as telling analysts: We completely remain in day-to-day charge
o ft h ec o m p a n y .W ea r eg o i n gt or u nC i t if o rs h a r e h o l d e r s . ”A tt h a tt i m et h eU St a x p a y e r
had already injected to Citi’s coﬀers $45 billion with the value of external equity merely
10% of the state’s funding. Despite partial ownership and the supply of a plethora of
implicit Put-type insurance policies mentioned earlier on, the taxpayer has been void of
any authority in shaping strategy, direction and restructuring of the failed behemoth.
Bailing out banks/ﬁnancial institutions is carried out under the presumption that they
will increase lending. However, the monetary policy response to stimulate growth by the
US Federal Reserve (and other central banks like the Bank of England) in the form of
quantitative easing has not been channeled into facilitating business activity, as banks
have been hoarding money to pump-up their balance sheets. Excess reserves have risen
dramatically: from 1.9 bil $ in August 2008 to 796.8 bil $ in January 2009, to 1583.5 bil $
in August 2011.13 A c c o r d i n gt oE d l i na n dJ a ﬀee (2009, p.2) one of the reasons that banks
decide to leave all this money parked at the Fed is that “ironically, the Federal Reserve has
started to pay interest on excess reserves, a change that increases bank incentive to hold,
rather than to lend, these reserves.” An aversion to piling up more illiquid risk and the
lack of trust between bankers due to the frailty, complexity and opacity of their balance
sheets’ exposure, makes them content with the 25 basis points that the Federal Reserve
banks are oﬀering instead for seeking higher returns through lending.
The toxic culture though of the world’s super-sized ﬁnance reigns supreme in the midst
of the economic crisis. The social costs for servicing the soaring levels of massive recovery
plans that are channeled for their rescue (totalling several trillion worldwide), and the
adverse knock-on eﬀects on health, education, eradication of poverty, and social welfare
expenses are dismissively regarded as mere collateral damage by the powerful corporate
networks, necessary for their longevity and prosperity. No matter how huge the social cost
of their predicaments is, granted by an abundance of Warrants, corporate elites will never
13http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/h3hist1.txt
12be disabused of their unquestioning belief in grandeur. This attitude is hardly surprising
given that the provision and distribution of Warrants is inﬂuenced by (i) senior bankers
who, since the late 1990s, have gradually inﬁltrated the commanding heights of public
life in the US by taking oﬃce (e.g. Jon Corzine, Hank Paulson, Robert Rubin), and (ii)
corporate lobbyists who try to shape the political agenda via generous donations and
fundraising activities for the beneﬁt of the main political parties/authorities.
An example of the latter is the Business Roundtable, BRT (www.businessroundtable.org),
founded in 1972 and consisting of the chief executives of most of the largest US-based
corporations and banks. “The BRT is particularly inﬂuential over US international trade
policies. In the early 1990s a Roundtable front group USA*NAFTA spent $10 million
to help secure the controversial North American Free Trade Agreement. In 2000 the
Roundtable successfully campaigned for unconditional access to US markets for goods
US corporations produce in China under commercially ideal, but often socially and en-
vironmentally deplorable, conditions. They spent over $30 million on lobbyists to help
Congress members make up their mind”.14
The BRT’s successes in shaping political decision making inspired corporate leaders
in Europe and elsewhere to create similar lobby groups (e.g. the European Roundtable
of industrialists launched in 1983, www.ert.be). Brussels, the centre of the European
Union with over 12,000 corporate lobbyists, rivals Washington as the world’s corporate
lobbying capital. Notably, “The City of London has its Brussels lobbying headquarters
opposite the European Commission head oﬃce. ...Yet the City of London is absent from
the Commission’s lobby transparency register” (WDM, 2010, p.28). The EU also follows
t h eU Si nt e r m so fi t sh i g ho ﬃcial/banker ‘revolving doors’: “Three former Commissioners
have taken up positions with Goldman Sachs at the end of their term; Peter Sutherland,
Karel van Miert and Mario Monti” (ib.). Interestingly, as sovereign debt crisis in the
Eurozone is turning to a watershed for reshaping economic policy to smite the welfare
system (see Section 5), Mario Monti became in November 2011 the (unelected) prime
minister of Italy to oﬀer his technocratic wisdom in credibly steering the country into
ﬁscal austerity and averting a market shutdown for the funding of national debt.
Stiglitz (2009) neatly outlines the institutional power of the put by pointing to “an-
other problem with America’s too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-be-restructured banks: they are
too politically powerful. Their lobbying eﬀorts worked well, ﬁrst to deregulate, and then
to have taxpayers pay for the cleanup.”
The multifarious array of beneﬁts for the banking industry of the Warrant Economics
Put and the secure power that it grants to its holders to continue their pernicious practices,
were glaringly evident during 2009/10 when the premature presumption was that the
global economy has seen oﬀ the worst of the crisis. Following the pumping by the US
14New Internationalist 347, July 2002, p.15.
13government in October 2008 of the ﬁrst portion of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief
Programme (TARP), nine large banks in the US got $125 billion (in 2009, Bank of America
got $20 billion more) in bailout funds. Subsequently, in early 2009, banks were subject
to stress tests, in fact not so stressful for many,15 and having met the requirements for
reserves/capital adequacy, more than half of the largest banks were declared as solvent,
having enough capital to survive a worst case scenario (see Time Magazine, September
26, 2011, p.38). Within a couple of months, the banks involved did start paying back the
emergency TARP funds, allowing them to resume their customary operations.
At ﬁrst glance, it seems that banks have repaid their life support, the Put’s premium,
that kept them aﬂoat at the peak of the crisis. This is entirely illusory and unashamedly
immoral. The refund by banks to the public purse, at very convenient credit terms, was
for the amount of a "loan", the state-funded capital injections to their balance sheets,
which represents a miniscule fraction of the true Warrant Economics Put’s payoﬀ that
they silently appropriate. Have banks paid back the cost of the state purchases of their
"bad" assets at above market prices? Have banks paid back their proﬁts for having the
worthless Credit Default Swaps issued by the collapsed Lehman Brothers settled at par
by the then Treasurer, Hank Paulson? Have investment banks like Goldman Sachs paid
for the privileged status of a ‘holding company’ that were granted in the aftermath of
2008? Have banks paid back any of the estimated $10 trillion cost to the taxpayer of the
various implicit or explicit guarantees? Not really, we suspect.
Instead, as the Barclays’ bank chief executive Bod Diamond (facing the Treasury
Select Committee on 11/1/11) infamously declared, “There was a period of remorse and
apology for banks. I think that period needs to be over.” The total employee compensation
subsidised by the publicly funded Put for the ﬁve US large banks - Citigroup, Bank of
America, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley - was $130 billion in
2010, up from $96 billion in 2008 (ib.); in the same vein, proﬁts were subsidised. The
article ‘Goldman Sachs: Don’t Blame Us’ in the BusinessWeek, April 1 2010, by Roben
Farzad is illuminating: “Eighteen months removed from the depths of the ﬁnancial crisis,
Goldman posted a $13.4 billion proﬁt in 2009, a Wall Street record. ... After Blankfein
sat for an interview with the London Times in November 2009, he famously quipped,
when he thought he was oﬀ the record, that he was just a banker "doing God’s work".”
For the divine holders of Calls and Puts, hubris will never lead to their nemesis.
15The main purpose of the stress tests was to assure the markets that banks hold enough reserves for
residential mortgages. Many experts though opined that reserves for commercial real estate were too
small and there were no reserves for impairment of sovereign debt. Worse, regulators never tested the
capacity of banks to fund themselves adequately if implicit or explicit state guarantees of their non-deposit
liabilities were withdrawn.
142.2 Exploitation of Inequality via Securitisation
Reading the ﬁrst chapter of Warrant Economics presented above, one begins to assimi-
late the haute-cuture tailoring of the true neoliberal straightjacket. Despite the veil of
illusion, created by the mantra of the ruling academic and political orthodoxies, of the
beneﬁts-for-all that "laissez-faire market competition" brings on a global scale, Warrant
Economics unveils the real rules of market fundamentalism (or, else, the distorted market
competition). In this respect, it is worth quoting the classical liberal of the 1930s Chicago
school, Simons ([1934]1948, p.42): “The representation of laissez faire as a merely do-
nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the state
under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which
competition can function eﬀectively as an agency of control.”
Warrant Economics though oﬀers a contrasting narrative. Create and sustain in-
equality via the Call-Put synergies, thus ultimately building the secluded kingdom of
‘Wealthistan’ in which only the plutocrats are granted residence and are meticulously
safeguarded (Put policy options) - the fatal consequences of their actions only aﬀect the
peasantry of the global economic landscape.
The second facet of Warrant Economics, and the precursor of the current global eco-
nomic crisis, is the phenomenal proliferation of innovative forms for the exploitation of
inequality by its main stakeholders. A once in a lifetime unregulated securitisation of the
public’s needs for various forms of material welfare, which cannot be satisﬁed through
squeezed real incomes, took place after the burst of the new economy bubble in 2000.
In the new millennium, the means of inequality exploitation have traversed beyond the
familiar avenues of the wage-productivity gap and the existence of a global reserve army
of labour (notably, even such traditional exploitation routes have been oﬀ the mainstream
literature map). The dreams of the modern peasantry for aﬀordable housing are high-
jacked by the salesmanship, short termism, and irresponsible fees culture of high ﬁnance
that rendered the real and durable asset of house ownership to a speculative and worthless
piece of paper.
The ﬁnance and banking industries, having the lion’s share of Warrants, fully exploited
the state’s donation during the credit expansion in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h en o u g h t i e s .T h e y
were equipped with an as good as cash structural collateral (Calls-Puts) and operated in a
period of a historically low cost of immediacy/liquidity (created by the Fed’s interest rate
policies and mimicked by central bankers elsewhere to curtail the adversity of the dotcom
shock). As a result, they levered up their stake in the society by securitising illiquid assets
(subprime mortgages, distressed loans, etc.) via innovative, yet opaque forms of over-the-
counter credit derivatives (collaterilised debt/loan obligations and derivatives written on
them). In the context of an unregulated environment, they created extremely proﬁtable
(mainly, fees-driven) business for themselves.
15For the US alone, Martin Wolf in the Financial Times (2008, February 5) notes: “the
proﬁts of ﬁnancial companies jumped from below 5 per cent of total corporate proﬁts,
after tax, in 1982 to 41 per cent in 2007, even though their share of corporate value
added only rose from 8 per cent to 16 per cent.” And in a later article, Financial Times
(2010, April 21), he observes that “The UK case is dramatic, with banking assets jumping
from 50 per cent of GDP to more than 550 per cent over the past four decades... The
combination of state insurance (which protects creditors) with limited liability (which
protects shareholders) creates a ﬁnancial doomsday machine.” A snapshot is also worth
noting: “In 2007 big ﬁnancial corporations posted record proﬁts - more than $70 billion
in Britain alone - along with record complaints about bad service.” (New Internationalist,
April 2009, ‘The Banks Bankrupting the World.’)
The institutional change that facilitated the extreme proliferation of oﬀ-balance sheet
contingent claims and the explosion of the shadow banking system, with the devastating
eﬀects that we are currently experiencing, was the successive relaxation and ﬁnal repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US that took place in 1999 under the auspices of the
Financial Modernization Act. Senators’ Glass and Steagall Act of 1933 put forward the
separation of commercial and investment banking for ﬁnancial conglomerates. History
repeats itself; the excesses of the ﬁnance industry in the pre Glass-Steagall Act era, which
led to the Great Crash and the depression of the 1930s, have been rejuvenated by the 1999
"diversiﬁcation" of ﬁnancial conglomerates into commercial and investment activities.16
In eﬀect, they have been free to use retail deposits, which are explicitly guaranteed by the
government, as collateral for speculative trading and toxic ﬁnancial engineering to create
internal hedge funds with stratospheric leverage relative to their capital basenumber. As
Kregel (2010) argues, the deregulation associated with the erosion of the (Glass-Steagall)
section 20 restrictions on bank activities led to a situation where both the asset and
liabilities sides of ﬁnancial institutions were leveraged.
Four years into the crisis and the day of reckoning for the banks’ reckless pursuit
of bumper proﬁts (concurrent with insane personal bonuses) is still way out of sight.
Multiple regulatory reforms to tame their activities (Basel III requirements at a global
level; Capital Requirements Directive IV in Europe; Dodd-Frank act in the US; Vickers
Commission report in the UK; Solvency II rules for the European Insurance Industry)
are still uncoordinated, thus open to regulatory arbitrage when implemented. Structural
reform of the universal banking model to ringfence (a feeble compromise on the necessity
for a complete break-up) the retail and commercial services from the systemically risky
investment banking arm, together with enhanced capital and liquidity requirements are
16In Britain, restrictions on the activities of ﬁnancial institutions were substantially weakened as a
result of market liberalisation and the regulatory ‘Big Bang’ of 1986. Although in other European Union
countries universal banks were present well before, they became aggressive in wholesale markets and
securities trading only recently in imitation of the Anglo-American model.
16being cynically contested by a throng of coordinated lobbyists.
This self-interested group, seizing on the stagnant economic environment, delivers
bloodcurdling warnings about the consequences of a restructuring. First, we are told
that lending to businesses for productive investment and lending to consumers will be
choked-oﬀ; in reality, this is a small component of their balance sheet compared with
the huge portion directed to the interbank market. Second, the regulatory reforms will
increase the cost of capital to investment banking, and reduce leverage and proﬁts - in our
opinion, a positive outcome that will halt excessive risk taking, curb short-term rewards
and redistribute funds to SMEs that create jobs for the wider economy and contribute
to socially beneﬁcial growth. Third, the new environment will potentially shift the risk
of lending from banks to unregulated shadow banking institutions, such as hedge funds,
private equity and industrial ﬁrms’ ﬁnance branches. Without understating the need to
place "shadow" entities under close supervision and strict capital rules, it deﬁes logic
to claim that the risks of internal shadow banking operations of universal banks were
adequately assessed and managed by their risk management systems up to the onslaught
of the crisis. All in all banks want the put and the high return on equity...
Despite the ethereal illusion of containment of the virulent practices of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, the trinity of their operations - securitisation, engineering and speculation - still
reigns supreme and takes full advantage of deregulation to ratchet up their proﬁtability
in commodities trading. Rising commodity prices, soaring food prices in particular, com-
press the purchasing power of wages/salaries in developed nations and mean hunger for
the citizens in the least developed world.
It is true that China’s growth, and of other emerging economies, together with biofuel
production have led to the commodity price bubble. At the same time, it is becoming
an unassailable belief that the morphing of exchange traded commodities into a class of
asset-backed securities has intensiﬁed price ﬂuctuations due to ﬁnancialisation rather than
market fundamentals.
Traditionally, commodity futures exchanges have oﬀered a transparent, safe and regu-
lated market environment for hedging and speculation. The bankruptcy of MF Global on
October 31 2011, one of the world’s largest futures brokers has resulted in $600m losses
for its customers, embarrassing regulators and reviving calls for tougher rules.17
17As recent as June 2011, the president of the Futures Industry Association, the brokers’ lobbyist in
the Washington administration, John Damgard “proudly testiﬁed to the US congress that no futures
broker failed during the crisis and no customers lost money because of regulatory failures” (Financial
Times, 2011, November 11). Under the command of Wall street insider, Jon Corzine, MF Global “failed
to uphold what its own sales brochure called a "cardinal safequard" of futures trading: keeping customer
and house funds separate” (ib.). Account segregation is a "sacrosanct" according to “Daniel Roth, the
president of the National Futures Association, an industry-funded self-regulatory body for US futures
markets” (ib.). As a blunt testament for the revolving doors of power, MF Global won in February 2010
fast track approval by William Dudley, the New York Fed President and a former colleague of Jon Corzine
at Goldman Sachs, to join the Wall Street elite of about 20 primary brokers to carry out monetary policy,
17It is worth reminding that, after the Wall Street crash in the US, the Roosevelt gov-
ernment recognised that speculative futures contracts were causing actual commodity
prices to be highly volatile and introduced the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. Reg-
ulations such as ‘position limits’ prevented excessive speculation by limiting the amount
of derivatives traded in a particular market (thus, averting ‘banking on hunger’), while
still enabling farmers to use derivatives to hedge their risk. In 1991 Goldman Sachs cre-
ated a commodity index fund which, after severe lobbying by the ﬁnancial industry, was
exempted from position limits. On the basis of an equally weighted index of commodity
futures, the ﬁndings of Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) that such commodity futures have
(i) a risk premium about equal the equity premium and higher than the bond premium,
and (ii) less downside risk relative to equity returns, were quite inﬂuential. Commod-
ity index funds became a widely used speculative vehicle in food commodity markets,
inﬂating both the level and volatility of prices: “As early as April 2006, Merrill Lynch
estimated that speculation was causing commodity prices to trade at 50 per cent higher
than if they were based on fundamental supply and demand alone” (WDM, 2010, p.9).
The Guardian (2011, 29 June) correctly points out that the historically low interest
rates, sustained by the injection of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing (QE) cash
into the banking system, turned away investors from low-yielding government bonds and
savings accounts, thus fueling the speculative demand for commodities. It is estimated
that the amount invested in commodity index funds increased from $46bn in 2005 to
$250bn in March 2008 and hit a record $451bn in April 2011, more than 40 times higher
than a decade ago (ib.; and WDM, 2010, p.10).
The rapid proliferation of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) among big institutions and
private investors and the huge expansion of their product suite are raising fresh sobering
destabilizing threats for an already frail global economy. It is estimated that the indus-
try has expanded by 40% a year for the past decade and as of April 2011, has nearly
$1,500bn assets under management among an estimated 2,670 ETFs in existence (Finan-
cial Times, 2011, June 5). To their defenders, ETFs oﬀer a cheap, transparent (since
listed on exchanges), and sensible ﬁnancial innovation which enables both institutional
and, more crucially, individual investors to gain access to a host of diﬀerent investment
classes. “With ETFs, every retail investor with an internet connection can make their own
attempt at being a global macro hedge fund manager” potentially engaging in split-second
distributing US debt as part of the Federal open market operations (Financial Times, 2011, November 6).
All this, with a mere $1bn in capital, a position 30 times weaker than that of most primary dealers like
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Barclays Capital etc. The MF Global debacle came when Jon Corzine,
having leapt the company’s leverage ratio to 40 to 1, placed a $6.3bn bet - six times its capital - on risky
European government debt which turned sour (ib.). When asked why MF Global was granted the status
of a primary dealer, “the US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke defensively responded that the
central bank was not the ﬁrm’s regulator” (ib.). Does the whole episode and the failure of a self-regulating
market give another uneasy sense of deja-vu?
18trading and moving between asset classes several times in the same day (Financial Times,
2011, May 27). Sceptics point out that ETFs enable and encourage herding, speed up
markets,18 and encourage short termism (ib.). It can thus be argued that ETFs represent
a further cause for price turbulence in food commodity markets that leads to an escalating
impoverishment in the developing world.
Recently though, the alarming range of complex and opaque synthetic ETFs19 oﬀered
by banks to (i) generate higher returns, (ii) get around the proprietary trading ban (intro-
duced in 2010 for investment banking), and (iii) raise funding against illiquid portfolios
that cannot be normally ﬁnanced in the repo market, is turning reminiscent to the toxic
product suite of exotic credit derivatives. In case of poor performance, such derivatives
may lead to yet another economic disaster due to their highly contagious and deleterious
eﬀects.
Analysing the degenerating state of economic aﬀairs in its two facets of creating/sustaining
and exploiting inequality, a question is desperate for an answer. How did market funda-
mentalism come to dominate the economics profession and why were the Call-Put policies
of the twisted market competition allowed to roar undisturbed? In the next section we
argue that the economic paradigm associated with the Warrant Economics state of capi-
talism received the eulogy of professionals under the fallacious view that economics stands
for the "physics of society".
3 Marketing Economics as "Physics of Society"
The Greek word ´ , economy, calls for the study of the law, ´  that insti-
tutions inﬂict upon the social functioning of the citizens of the house, ´  the latter
typically in a loose sense depicting either a social micro-unit or a macro one (city, or ´ 
in the ancient Greek city-state political structure). Since the publication of The Wealth
of Nations in 1776, widely acknowledged as the birth of political economy, economic dis-
course has traversed avenues that their diversity is more striking that their similarity. The
starting perception of classical economists (Smith, Mill, Marx) that political economy is
an all-embracing social science was ﬁrst challenged in the writings of Ricardo in which
the historical, the institutional, and the factual faded into the background. This mindset
18As, for example, during the “...Wall Street’s equity "ﬂash crash" of May 2010, when share prices of
many companies plummeted in a matter of minutes for little obvious reason. ETFs accounted for 70% of
cancelled trades that ensued - despite representing only 11% of securities in the US.” (Financial Times,
2011, June 5).
19Unlike physically replicated ETFs where the funds own at least some of the assets, synthetic ETFs,
representing nearly half of the market in Europe and becoming dominant in Asia as well, earn their
return through a derivative, typically a swap from the parent bank. The boutique of ETF structures has
e x p a n d e dt o" s h o r t "E T F sw h i c ho ﬀer a positive return if the assets involved fall in value, "leveraged"
ETFs which promise an above normal return and "actively managed" ETFs which may provide a choice
over the underlying assets. (Financial Times, 2011, June 5.)
19evolved to the marginalists (Jevons, Walras) and, subsequently, to the dominance of the
neoclassical orthodoxy’s view in Mises and Hayek’s reorientation of the Austrian school
— over alternative multi-disciplinary approaches oﬀered by the German historical school
(Roscher, Schmoller) and the British historical school (Leslie, Cunningham, Asley), or
American institutionalism (i.e. Veblen, Commons, Mitchell) — that economics as a scien-
tiﬁc discipline should be separate and alien to the other social sciences.20
A nearly 200 years old rich scientiﬁc tradition, replete with famous and typically
interminable intellectual battles, with diverse methodological forms of enquiry, full of
enduring controversies about what economists could and/or should explain came to a
halt by the univocal adoption by the orthodoxy of the axiomatic, ultra-deductivism of the
1950s general equilibrium "theory". Reinforced by a totalitarian reliance on abstract micro
foundations, solely driven by strong priors on the form and purpose of our social science
and the mathematical necessity that a pure closed logical system entails, the dominant
paradigm oﬀered a pseudo-positivist demarcation criterion about what is acceptable as
scientiﬁc economic theory and what is not: a priori micro foundations equals "theory";
all competing accounts of institutional, social, and historical aspects in economics are
synonymous to story telling. The central aim of the established priesthood was to retreat
economics to a phlogiston state that makes it part of natural rather than social sciences,
elevating economics to (seemingly) value-free "physics of the society". Solow (1986, p.25-
26) put the point in remarkable clarity: “My impression is that the best and brightest of
the profession proceed as if economics is the physics of society. There is a single universally
valid model of the world. It only needs to be applied. You could drop a modern economist
from a time machine - a helicopter maybe, like the one that drops the money - at any
time, in any place, along with his or her personal computer; he or she could set up in
business without even bothering to ask what time and which place.”
Here is the fallacy of the view of economics as the physics of society. As the physicists
Steinhardt and Turok (2007, p.234) point out “The theory may turn out to be mathemat-
ically beautiful and philosophically appealing. And then ... the theorists may wake up
one morning, connect to the Internet, and learn about a new observation that completely
kills the idea.” Like many scientists, the authors “feel it is important to insist that science
should remain based on the principle that statements have meaning only if they can be
veriﬁed or refuted. Ideas whose assumptions can never be tested lie outside the realm
of science” (ib., 234). Any principle that relies “on untestable assumptions, is never at
risk of being proved wrong. On this uneven playing ﬁeld, few will feel encouraged to seek
scientiﬁcally refutable alternatives.”(ib., p.235)
Notably, when physicists confronted the natural microcosm they embraced what have
20See Milonakis and Fine (2009) for an excellent exposition of the method, the social and the historical
foundations in the evolution of economic theory.
20become the fundamental tenets of quantum theory: (i) Heisenberg’s uncertainty (or in-
determinacy) principle, i.e. “it is impossible to know an object’s precise position and its
velocity at the same time”; (ii) the wave-particle duality, i.e. “all matter particles and
force ﬁelds come in discrete, indivisible energy packets that can exhibit both particle-
like and wave-like characteristics, depending on the circumstances”,21 and (iii) Bohr’s
argument on the complementarity between the particle- and wave-like representations.
“Einstein had devoted his life to probing into that objective world of physical processes
which runs its course in space and time, independent of us, according to ﬁrm laws. ...
Later in his life, also, when quantum theory had long become an integral part of modern
physics, Einstein was unable to change his attitude - at best, he was prepared to accept
the existence of quantum theory as a temporary expedient. “God does not throw dice”
was his unshakable principle, one that he would not allow anybody to challenge. To which
Bohr could only counter, “Nor is our business to prescribe to God how he should run the
world.”” (Heisenberg, [1971]1985, p.171)
One could compare and contrast the quantum theorists’ insights for the microcosm
and their relation to the macrocosm that physicists ponder (incidentally using extremely
sophisticated and rigorous technical apparatuses) to the mechanistic wisdom of the a
priori, axiomatic camp of economists, or more accurately, "social" mathematicians.22
Their vision is tangential to the Alchian thesis: the view that competition represents a
Darwinian selection mechanism that produces exactly the same outcome that would ensue
from a world in which consumers maximised utility and businessmen maximised proﬁts
(Blaug, 1992, p.249). Their main syllogism is that the ever utility maximising agents
will (via the invisible hand) produce aggregate outcomes, i.e. the micro sanctuary of the
representative agent will evolve to a sustainable and realistic (!) macro equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the concept of the representative agent is strikingly at odds with
the Darwinian perspective: “Darwin made a radical break with the typological tradition
of essentialism by initiating an entirely new way of thinking. What we ﬁnd among living
organisms, he said, are not constant classes (types), but variable populations. ...Within a
population, in contrast to a class, every individual is uniquely diﬀerent from every other
individual. ...Darwin’s new way of thinking, being based on the study of populations, is
now referred to as population thinking. ... [This] is the foundation of modern evolutionary
theory and one of the basic constituents of the philosophy of biology.” (Mayr, 2001, p.75)
Regarding our understanding of the universe, Einstein developed his own model of the
cosmos on the basis of his seminal theory of gravity (general relativity) and argued that
21Steinhardt and Turok (2007, p.74-75).
22A remark made by Robert Lucas to Patinkin (cited in Backhouse, 2002, p.189) is telling: “your use of
the term ‘mechanical’ as a pejorative applied to theories, and our discussion of this in class. This helped
push me to the extreme view ... that well-formulated theories are machines, and therefore necessarily
mechanical.”
21it is static. Hubble proved empirically in 1929 that the universe is not static; although
the idea of an unchanging universe was revived in the 1950s, the discovery of the cosmic
background radiation by Bell Laboratory astronomers in 1963 gave the ﬁnal blow to the
steady-state model. In the early 1990s, the discovery of the existence of dark energy made
it clear that the axiom ‘gravity always attracts’ applies only to some forms of energy, like
ordinary (visible) matter and dark matter. Other forms of energy, like dark energy, can
gravitationally repel. Steinhardt and Turok (2007) take us beyond the Big Bang into
the Endless Universe with their authoritative exposition of cosmological theories and the
emergence of an alternative model that challenges the accepted view for the universe.
In their exploration, cosmologists deﬁne space as ﬂat if two parallel laser beams, sent
oﬀ in any direction in three-dimensional space, never cross or diverge; if the two initially
parallel light beams intersect, space has a positive curvature and the universe is closed;
on the other hand, an open universe has a negative curvature and the two parallel light
beams diverge. Since scientists cannot travel back in time and thus cannot perform
direct experiments on the universe, they gather indirect information about its history by
launching satellite missions. An example is the WMAP (Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy
Probe) equipped with highly sensitive detectors to gather some of the ancient light emitted
from the dark layer about 14 billion years ago. The WMAP measurements, announced
by NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) in February 2003, showed
conclusively that the curvature is negligible and space is nearly ﬂat - research in physics
seeks to explain this fundamental feature of the universe. Furthermore, the WMAP 7-year
results released on 26 January 2010 demonstrated that dark energy makes up 73%, dark
matter 23%, and ordinary matter is only about 4% of our universe.
If it is diﬃcult for physicists to ﬁnd simple, all-encompassing explanations for the
fundamental mechanisms underlying nature (such as Newton’s laws of motion), how can
economic "theorists" be trusted when they claim to have developed a universal model for
human economic activity?
Nevertheless, we should point out that the impressive discoveries of Galileo (1564-1642)
led scientists across the disciplinary spectrum to believe that all nature functioned as a
large cosmic clock, subject to the laws of physics. Following the seminal demonstration
by William Harvey (1578-1657) that our heart functions like a pump, the French philoso-
pher René Descartes (1596-1650) argued that the material brain was a complex machine
obeying the laws of physics, entirely distinct from the immaterial mind. The machinelike
cosmos replaced the ancient Greek viewpoint that nature as a whole is a living organism,
and the brain/mind dichotomy dominated science for about four hundred years. However,
recent developments in neuroscience argue in favour of the plasticity of the brain versus
a hardwired system, as state-of-the-art laboratory analysis demonstrates that brain maps
are neither immutable within a singe brain nor universal. This fundamental brain prop-
22erty of ‘neuroplasticity’ is in stark contrast with the old wisdom of ‘localisation’, i.e. a
mechanistic brain with specialised parts (for a fascinating journey through the frontiers
of brain science see Doidge, 2007).23 A neuroplastically informed view of human activity
implies a bidirectional feedback between brain and culture - brain and genetics give rise
to culture, while culture shapes the brain.
The Great Recession vindicates the degenerating status of the research programme of
the economic orthodoxy prevailing since the 1980s.24 T h i sc o m e sa sn os u r p r i s eg i v e n( i )
the fallacious view of economics as the physics of society, and (ii) the implication of modern
evolutionary theory and modern neuroscience that the concept of the representative agent
is defunct. In what follows, we will demonstrate that the Great Recession cannot be seen
as an unpredictable tsunami-like event but, instead, it is a symptom of the regressive
neoliberal policies that, over the years, put Warrant Economics on solid ground.
4 Warrant Economics: Too Big, Too Concealed, Too
Rewarding (for the few) to Fail
4.1 The Background
The historical footprint of Warrant Economics is marked by Lionel Robbins ([1932]2007,
p.15) deﬁnition: “Economics is a science which studies human behaviour as a relationship
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” The marginalist traditions
are thus rounded oﬀ and, by singling out the rational choice under constraints, economics
is deprived from its main enterprise to study the formation of the ‘Wealth of Nations’
and its distribution. It subsequently opened up the (in)famous gates of the positive, (ar-
guably) value-free, (seemingly) neutral with respect to the objectives of economic policy,
microfounded form of enquiry, and elevated such a methodological monism as the sole
scientiﬁc modus faciendi of economics.
As a result, the revival of interest in the Walrasian general equilibrium system (rele-
gated to a mere appendix in Marshall’s Principles as Blaug (1992, p.168) argues) attains
its apotheosis with the ultra-deductive work pioneered by Arrow and Debreu (1954),
among others. The study of the causes and conditions of material welfare is dictated by
the positivist Paretian eﬃciency criterion, i.e. the preclusion of outcomes in which mutual
gains remain unexploited. This is formally expressed in the two Fundamental Theorems
23Doidge (2007, p.212-213) explains Descartes’ motivation for the brain/mind dichotomy and comments
on its eﬀect: “His noble attempt to rescue the brain from the mysticism that surrounded it in his time,
by making it mechanical, failed. Instead the brain ca m et ob es e e na sa ni n e r t ,i n a n i m a t em a c h i n et h a t
could be moved to action only by the immaterial, ghostlike soul Descartes placed within it, which came
to be called ‘the ghost in the machine’. By depicting a mechanistic brain, Descartes drained the life out
of it and slowed the acceptance of brain plasticity more than any other thinker.”
24The term ‘research programme’ is borrowed from Imre Lakatos ([1978]1999).
23of Welfare Economics which, in a nutshell, "prove" that unfettered market competition
and exchange produce Pareto optimal equilibrium allocations. Whereas the First Theo-
rem shies away from matters of distribution, it is left to the Second Theorem to assert
that wealth redistribution cum Walrasian exchange represents a mechanism capable of
achieving any feasible Pareto optimum. In that vein, general equilibrium theory becomes
the ‘be all’ and ‘end all’ ad gloriam apparatus.25
Social eﬃciency, which raises penetrating questions of equity/distributive justice and
ethical concerns about the operation of a competitive market system, is in eﬀect ostracised
from the playground of positive economics. To his credit, Arrow (1970, p.4) was blatantly
clear about the welfare theorems’ schema: “Any complaints about [the competitive price
system’s] operation can be reduced to complaints about the distribution of income, which
should then be rectiﬁed by lump-sum transfers. Of course, as Pareto already emphasized,
the proposition provides no basis for accepting the results of the market in the absence
of accepted levels of income equality. ...The price system itself determines the income
distribution only in the sense of preserving the status quo. Even if costless lump-sum
transfers are possible, there is needed a collective mechanism reallocating income if the
status quo is not regarded as satisfactory.” Despite Arrow’s clariﬁcations for the limitation
of the price system to produce equitable results without the aid of a collective agency
(e.g. government), GE paved the way for the concomitant developments made by, mainly,
the Friedman inspired Chicago assembly line of rational expectations, natural rate of
unemployment, eﬃcient (ﬁnancial) markets hypothesis and real business cycle models.
This modernist fairy tale has the following narrative. First, the economy is a self-
contained and self-regulated entity, housing exogenous institutions, inhabited by a ratio-
nal, self-regarding, fully informed and forward-looking representative agent with exoge-
nous preferences. Second, the technology utilised is superﬁcially modelled by an aggregate
production function exhibiting non increasing returns to scale.26 Third, complete and en-
forceable contracts (or, in Coase’s tradition, no impediments to eﬃcient and costless
bargaining) are exchanged in competitive markets. All in all, the neoclassical research
programme spells an equilibrium associated with an allocative distribution that is Pareto
optimal.
A ﬂavour of ‘Keynesian economics’ - sharply distinguished from the ‘economics of
Keynes’ by Leijonhufvud (1968) - was absorbed into the neoclassical mainstream in the
25It is worth quoting Hutchison (2000, p.315): “For what GE analysis has done to Smith’s conjecture
is to eviscerate it of real-world content, and transform it into a piece of "rigorous", empirically vacuous,
hyper-abstract analysis, based on a range of fantastic, science-ﬁctional assumptions.”
26It has been known for a considerable time that it is not possible to derive an aggregate production
function from individual production functions, even as an approximation (Fisher, 1969). Joan Robinson’s
view (1978, p.76) is particularly caustic: “... the production function has been a powerful instrument of
miseducation.” The convenient argument that the aggregate production function often gives satisfactory
statistical ﬁts does not rescue its adoption (Felipe and McCombie, 2005).
24form of the neoclassical synthesis and, more recently, into what Goodfriend and King
(1997) have coined as the new neoclassical synthesis. The latter assimilates the benchmark
rational expectations/real business cycle model with new Keynesian elements of imperfect
competition, sticky prices and market frictions. The ensuing dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) setting, a “honoriﬁc label” as argued by Solow (2008), oﬀered the
rationale for the macroeconomic policy of inﬂation targeting, aka the new consensus in
macroeconomics, which was adopted universally by central bankers and policy makers in
the pre-2008 era as the undisputed, rollercoster macroeconomic dictum.
DSGE models - both the purist neoclassical and new Keynesian versions - were poised
to oﬀer a logically closed, theoretically coherent framework (for the self-referential criteria
of their advocates in the academic macroeconomics orthodoxy) which would adequately
identify structural "shocks" within its own narrowly deﬁned sphere of interactions. All
this, despite the tensions between the two camps (see, for example, Chari et al., 2009), in
our opinion, cursory for their suspicious policy relevance. Their stock of the make-believe
knowledgeable technical superiority assumes that the passage of time, and the concomitant
systemic uncertainty that it entails, is simply depicted as a calculable risk represented by
a discount/risk aversion rate; institutions do not evolve, aggregate relationships are of the
same form as those obtained by the optimising decision rules of the homogeneous rational
individual. Global and housing market variables that proved central to the transmission
of the ﬁnancial crisis are largely in absentia, the existence of systemic bubbles is a priori
dismissed, the role of government and ﬁscal policy is given limited license.
Understandably, Solow (2008, p.245) is “left with a puzzle, or even a challenge. What
accounts for the ability of “modern macro” to win hearts and minds among bright and
enterprising academic economists?” For Chari and Kehoe (2008, p.249) “the answer is
simple: the attractions of modern macroeconomics are similar to the attractions that led
Robert Solow to develop the growth model and James Tobin to develop portfolio theory
and Paul Samuelson to develop the overlapping generations model. These economists, like
others before and since, were attracted to using what was then the frontier of economic
theory in an attempt to shed light on the day’s challenging macroeconomic questions.”
However, we should point out that for a battery of models that are christened as
relevant for policy decision making by central bankers and treasurers alike, one would
normally expect, at the very minimum, that plausible interactions between macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial variables would be a central theme in such settings; in reality though, even
ﬁnancial variables do not feature in the implementation of macro DSGE models. In his
thorough survey of some of the recent macro-ﬁnance literature and the associated models
used by central banks, Smith (2009, p.10) argues that “The reason that only real variables
are used to evaluate DSGE macro models is that for many ﬁnancial variables, the standard
theory does not work, or only works with such long and variable lags as to be irrelevant
25to the policy issues. The fact that the theory does not work is reﬂected in the prevalence
of ‘puzzles’ of which there are many.”
Nevertheless, the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved for all
practical purposes” declared Lucas (quoted in Krugman, 2008, p.9) in his 2003 presiden-
tial address to the American Economic Association. Woodford (2009) argued that there
has been convergence of views, a pervasive fallacy in our opinion, in fundamental macro-
economic issues: (i) models with coherent intertemporal general-equilibrium foundations
should be used, (ii) quantitative policy analysis should be based on econometrically val-
idated structural models, (iii) model expectations as endogenous, (iv) real disturbances
are an important factor of economic ﬂuctuations, and (v) monetary policy is eﬀective,
especially in terms of controlling inﬂation. In the light of such wide agreement, he con-
cludes that “... prospects are unusually bright for progress with lasting consequences, due
to the increased possibility of productive dialogue between theory and empirical work on
the one hand, and between theory and practice on the other.” (ib., p.277)
The Great Recession is challenging the ‘received view’ in macroeconomics and makes
people to realise that this glittering scientiﬁc scalpel is, in one operation after another,
killing many a patient.27
4.2 Reality Verdict
The looming question that has to be addressed is how laissez faire economics, the supremacy
of which was presumed by the neolibertarian philosophy to be hardwired in the mindset
of economists, has been transformed to a state of Warrant Economics. The Call-Put
policies of the latter suﬀocate competition for SMEs, concentrate control rights, operate
under oligopolistic forms of production (thus enjoying non competitive, mind-boggling
proﬁts), and distort the distribution of the surplus of the world’s economy produce. In
other words, how ever is it possible that instead of being competitive ‘price takers’, the
‘price makers’ of today’s oligopolistic behemoths of Warrant Economics prevail.
The answer to this striking conundrum is twofold. First, the segregated discourse be-
tween the mere rhetoric of the fundamental welfare theorems and the subtle possibilities of
the general theory of the second best introduced by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57). “The
general theorem of the second best states that if one of the Paretian optimum conditions
cannot be fulﬁlled a second best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all
other optimum conditions. ... The theory of the Paretian optimum is concerned with the
conditions that must be fulﬁlled in order to maximize some function subject to a set of
constraints which are generally considered to be ‘in the nature of things’.” (ib., p.12) A
plausible corollary is that a production unit which generates more than a Pareto-optimal
27The term received view is borrowed from McCloskey (1983, p.481-517).
26level of output can be contained if it becomes a monopoly, thereby restricting output.
Otherwise, the competitive output level set at a price that equals marginal cost could, in
this case, reduce rather than enhance (Paretian) welfare. In a general equilibrium setting,
monopolies are not only possible but "are proved" even optimal! Alas, "theory", shielded
by stratagems,28 endorses too proﬁtable and too big to fail monopolistic entities.
Second, through the devious dialectic in the neoliberal strand of economics between
a conspicuous apathy towards the real state of capitalism and the ferocious attempts
to legitimize the existence and practice of global monopolies.29 Galbraith’s (2004, p.24)
passage is castigating: “The phrase ‘monopoly capitalism,’ once in common use, has been
dropped from the academic and political lexicon.”
Although the intellectual contortions necessary to compass such a faculty of thought
beggar belief, a few remarks stand out. However one twists its auxiliary assumptions,
the neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm, is inapplicable to situations of oligopoly (cf. Blaug,
1992, p.157-160). In addition, “There is no oligopoly theory. There are bits and pieces of
models: some reasonably well analyzed, some scarcely investigated. Our so-called theories
are based upon a mixture of common sense, uncommon sense, a few observations, a great
amount of casual empiricism, and a certain amount of mathematics and logic” (Blaug,
1992, p.157, quoting Shubik, 1970, p.415).
It is particularly pertinent to our thesis on Warrant Economics the switch from the
ideals of liberalism to neoliberalism made by the Chicago school and its followers in
the early 1950s and the ‘shifting attitude toward concentrations of business power’ (Van
Horn, 2011). Simons ([1934] 1948, p.43) noted: “Thus, the great enemy of democracy
is monopoly...”, and argued for the “Elimination of private monopoly in all its forms...
1. Through drastic measures for establishing and maintaining eﬀectively competitive
conditions in all industries where competition can function as a regulative agency..., and
2. Through gradual transition to direct gover n m e n to w n e r s h i pa n do p e r a t i o ni nt h ec a s e
of all industries where competition cannot be made to function eﬀectively as an agency
of control” (ib., p.57).
One may compare and contrast the libertarian philosophy of Simons to the post-1950
Chigago-school research agenda that the distortive eﬀects in the production and welfare
process of monopolies/oligopolies are rather benign and that the dynamic process of
rivalry between giant corporations will produce results that approximate the outcome of
a perfectly competitive process. It is beyond the scope of our present work to review such
a voluminous endeavour of artiﬁcially camouﬂaging the role and impact of monopolies
28As Popper calls the ad hoc hypotheses or mere linguistic devices, i.e. the auxiliary hypotheses which
save a theory but do not satisfy certain well-deﬁned conditions (see Lakatos, 1978, p.33).
29We use the term monopoly in a loose sense, referring to productive units enjoying market power
to aﬀect prices, output, and investment in an industry, and being able to impose barriers to entry.
Throughout our thesis, monopoly and oligopoly are interchanged.
27- for that matter see Foster et al. (2011, p.15-16) who highlight the works of, among
others, Coase on the ‘Nature of the Firm’ that introduced transactions costs to rationalise
corporate vertical integration, Williamson on the eﬃciency arguments of markets and
hierarchies, and Bork on the ‘Antitrust Paradox’.
In the meantime, reality bites: a tangible proxy of the competitive ﬁrst best is asphyxi-
ated, the second best ﬂirts with an oligopolistic settlement, and the sacrosanct competitive
market is transformed into a playground of concentrated power through the Call-Put ser-
vices of Warrant Economics. In fact, for the US, the evidence provided by Foster et al.
(2011, p.5) “suggests that economic concentration is greater today than it has ever been,
and it has increased sharply over the past two decades.”
Warrant economics unravels the real life conditions that form a conglomerate. Not
through exogenous violations of the ﬁctitious assumptions of the ﬁrst best paradigm. Nei-
ther through the elegy of a distorted competitor, who inexplicably departs from a Paretian
competitive quota, and is castigated by the second best. Nor through the Chicago-school
inspired dictum that market-generated monopolies are eﬃcient allocators of resources
and price utility. But instead, via an institutionally facilitated mechanism that erects
productive entities that dominate any feasible competitive alternative through Call-Put
patronised economies of scale.
Our analysis contains echoes of the works of (i) Baran and Sweezy (1966) who substi-
tuted the law of falling proﬁt in competitive capitalism with the law of rising surplus in
monopoly capitalism,30 (ii) Steindl ([1952]1976) who explained the Great Depression of
the 1930s as a logical outcome of the monopolistic functioning of the capitalist system,
and, to a larger extent (iii) Kalecki ([1952]2009) who conclusively argued that “The degree
of monopoly has a general tendency to increase in the long run and thus to depress the
relative share of wages in income...” (ib., p.30), and “Moreover, if the eﬀect of the increase
in the degree of monopoly upon the distribution of national income is not counteracted
by other factors [e.g. intensity of innovations] there will be a relative shift from wages
to proﬁt, and this will constitute another reason for the slowing down in the long-run
rise in output” (ib., p.161). Furthermore, our thesis is tangential to the work of Braudel
(1979) - see Wallerstein (1991) for an exposition of Braudel’s view of capitalism. Braudel
saw capitalism not as the establishment of a free, competitive market but, instead, as the
system of the antimarket, i.e. the zone of concentration and a relatively high degree of
monopolisation. He further perused the entwined functions of the state as (i) a regulator
that contains the forces of the antimarket, and thus promotes competition and freedom,
and (ii) a guarantor of monopoly.
30The authors state that this substitution does not reject the time-honoured classical-Marxian theorem
of the tendency of the rate of proﬁt to fall, as “we are simply taking account of the undoubted fact
that the structure of the capitalist economy has undergone a fundamental change since that theorem was
formulated.” (ib., p.72)
28Finally, in the ﬁrst rounds of the Great Recession, there has been a rediscovery of
Keynes (1936) ‘General Theory’ and the need for expansionary ﬁscal policy to counter
the slump. It is worth noting that the assumption of a perfectly competitive environ-
ment, the rare, if at all, mentioning of the impact of monopolies, and the absence of any
distributional issues are all conspicuous in the work of Keynes. Thus, it is hardly surpris-
i n gt h a td e s p i t et h eﬁscal stimuli, Warrant Economics has become stronger in terms of
concentration of power and surplus, monopolistic proﬁts, reserves and cash hoarding by
banks and big corporations, lack of productive investments, high levels of unemployment
and growing inequality.
5 In the Slipstream of Warrant Economics: The Sov-
ereign Debt Crisis
The latest piece in the canvas of the Great Recession, and the even Greater Confusion
that impedes the enunciation of the underlying causes of our woes, unfolds in 2011 by
the escalating eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the ﬁr s tt i m ee v e rd o w n g r a d eo ft h e
US to AA+ by Standard & Poor’s, one of the rating agencies. Alarming statistics for
the poor state of the real and banking sectors, high and persistent unemployment rates,
together with a pessimistic outlook for growth in the US, Japan and the European Union,
all contribute to a new wave of turmoil in global capital markets and bring closer to sight
the trauma of a second great meltdown.
Despite the renewed tremors though, the cauldron of Warrant Economics capitalism
remains ﬁrmly based on its ideological grounds and is meticulously stirred by its bastions.
In the midst of economic stagnation and rising unemployment, it unleashes a ferocious
attack on the last remnants of the european welfare state, the indirect wage that has
shielded the middle class from the wilder ravages of top-down capitalism and has averted
social carnage in previous recessions, and on Medicare and Social Security programmes in
the US. Such a fresh assault is grounded on the fetishism of short-term ﬁscal consolidation
a n dA A As o v e r e i g nr a t i n g .
A forceful private-public-academic (PPA) partnership is formed to ringfence the preser-
vation of Warrant Economics through a new wave of neoliberal economic policies with a
twofold eﬀect: (i) the strangle of the SMEs engendered by both a prolonged credit draught
instigated by bailed-out banks in need of recapitalisation (while big multinationals are able
to fund themselves directly from capital markets at historically low interest rate levels)
and an escalating shortage of eﬀective demand (as the ﬂow of spending in the real econ-
omy is curtailed by the draconian ﬁscal austerity measures undertaken in most industrial
countries - bar US for the moment), and (ii) the further squeeze of the bottom 99% of the
29income distribution. In eﬀect, monopolistic entities and the slice of the pie accruing to the
top 1% of the income distribution are being progressively ﬁrewalled from an open-ended
rivalry for power and distribution of the global economic surplus.
The stakes are high for the custodians of Warrant Economics - politicians, ﬁnance
ministers, central bankers, and austerian academics.31 On one hand, to discredit the
model which provides economic welfare through progressive taxation (a Pigou-Marshall
type of tax and subsidies structure) and sits alongside a private enterprise economy. A
social democratic model32 that formed the basis of the post-WWII successful settlement
in Western Europe and, despite the political innuendos, is taking a viable hold on the
current administration in the US. On the other, to reinstate the badly bruised, by the
economic crisis, ideology of the followers of Friedrich Hayek’s and Milton Friedman’s
neoliberalism preaching that, within a basic framework of law and morality, any attempts
by governments to inﬂuence the Alchian process of the market would be counterproductive
and doomed to fail.
In doing so, there is laborious work to be carried out by the PPA partnership: the
private sector failure that led to the Great Recession must be reproﬁled as a public sector
crisis; the narrative is that "excessive" state spending in many western democracies has
led to "unsustainable" debt and deﬁcit levels that will inhibit future growth and pause a
major threat to welfare. At the same time, the battered status of the supremacy of the
(oligopolistic) market has to be rekindled in the minds of the public as the most eﬃcient
allocator and utiliser of scarce resources. Ultimately, the practice of socialising the costs
of reckless private risk taking and lending, while at the same time securing wild proﬁts in
the private coﬀers, needs to be reengineered.
Lifelines and market leverage for the PPA project are given in abundance by the
practice of rampant private sector species: bond vigilantes (mainly, institutional bond
holders), and the unregulated market of over-the-counter Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
- especially of the naked variety - populated by traders and investors with a voracious
appetite for speculative short-term proﬁts that can only materialise in the shadows of a
collapsing sovereign. Ironically, throughout the Great Recession, creditors have been the
main beneﬁciaries of the Warrant Economics Put and just as culpable for their conspicuous
non vigilant lending in the pre-2008 era as the currently stigmatised sovereign debtors.
All these, under the aegis of the unrated cartel of the rating agencies whose procyclical
actions further destabilised the economic system without being curtailed by regulators.
It makes a mockery though of the technocratic wisdom of the rating agencies, and
31In a similar spirit, Krugman (2010) notes that “the policy elite — central bankers, ﬁnance ministers,
politicians, who pose as defenders of ﬁscal virtue, are acting like the priests of an ancient cult, demanding
that we engage in human sacriﬁces to appease the anger of invisible gods.”
32Initiated by the policy proposals of the German revisionist Eduard Bernstein and the founder of the
British welfare state William H. Beveridge.
30deﬁes their underwritten clarion call for ﬁscal tightening, the fact that US 10-year bond
yields (post downgrade to AA+) are hovering in the record low vicinity of 2%; Japan, the
world’s second largest government bond market at $7,900bn (Y 875,000 bn, US being the
ﬁrst at $9,500bn at the end of 2010) has lost its stamp of AAA rating since 2002, and
in 2011 has been downgraded by S&P to AA-. The "catastrophic" consequence: Japan’s
10-year bond yields are millennia low at around 1% despite debt to GDP ratio well above
200% and eye-catching primary deﬁcits. In a nutshell, even if one subscribes to the "ﬂight
to safety" tentative argument, markets are short of supply of Japanese and US bonds,
despite the much heralded ﬁscal frailties of these economies. This is a clear aberration
from the poster case made by the economic and policy elites that ﬁscal austerity is a
virtue in its own right to avert an alleged future economic perdition.
Despite the habitual and opportunistic tensions in the PPA group to convince the
leading economies (that issue their own currency) of the rightfulness of ﬁscal consolidation,
there is a uniform urge for prolonged austerity measures in Eurozone members caught in
the spotlight of the sovereign mayhem and trapped in an asymmetric monetary system.
Notwithstanding the political capital invested to corroborate the contrary, the latter is
turning out to be a ﬂawed economic experiment; a precarious illusion lecturing that, as
long as ﬁscal deﬁcits are tamed, the prowess of the policies of the ECB will eventually
enable the transition to a prosperous Euroland where performance and competitiveness
will be converging. Within a decade of its creation, Eurozone is gradually morphed to an
economic settlement uncommunicative to (i) the perils of the diverse balance of payments
of its participants, a diversity which was thought to vanish by default in the adopted
theoretical models of small open economies interacting under a common currency, and
(ii) the traumas of structural current account deﬁcits that lead to escalating net external
liabilities - lubricated by the unscrupulous (albeit proﬁtable) lending practices of banks.
Besides an alarming (or not) percentage of GDP, we view the origins, dynamics, and
disparate beneﬁts behind the accumulation of sovereign debt in the Eurozone South (and
elsewhere) as a complex socioeconomic phenomenon which grants the myriad of creditors
with unassailable and opaque powers to undermine national independence. In a colonial-
type fashion, technocratic inspectorates are dispatched to swarm over the ministries of
debt-ridden countries, highjack ﬁscal policy and impose shock therapy "rescue" plans,
push through state selloﬀs at collapsing market prices and enfeeble democracy, the most
sacred founding principle of the states of the European Union.33 All this, despite the
33In the context of Warrant Economics, we reserve for future work to examine the multitude of causes
for the emergence of government budget deﬁcits and to take stock of the main beneﬁciaries of the ac-
cumulation of national debt. It is worth pointing out that the startling clarity of the balance sheet
of a country’s gross domestic (national) product, GDP, oﬀers an invaluable apparatus for such a task.
Kalecki (1952, p.45-52) oﬀers an authoritative and illuminating exposition. In short, drawing from the
fundamental identity of national accounts, i.e. the income and expenditures sides of GDP are equal, we
obtain:
31growing conviction that the economic beneﬁts of piling on debt are predominantly accruing
to the ‘structural mercantilists of the core’34. For example, Brecht et al. (2010) argue
that “Germany’s growth strategy continues to rely heavily on sustained deﬁcits (public
or private) in other European countries.” The ruling mantra is that high government
indebtness is a deadly virus to be contained, and expansionary ﬁscal policies should be
heading to oblivion.
The intellectual input to the PPA aﬃliation by austerian academics is mainly grounded
on the highly debated Ricardian equivalence proposition that public debt issuance is equiv-
alent to taxation. This view was cautiously speculated (for practical policy prescriptions
such as the funding of military conﬂict by ‘war bonds’) by Ricardo ([1846]2009) and re-
examined and aﬃrmed by Barro (1974). The conventional view in public ﬁnance theory
had been that “...the issuance of government debt stimulates aggregate demand and eco-
nomic growth in the short run but crowds out capital and reduces national income in the
long run” (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998, p.1-2). However, the view of government debt
that has been immensely inﬂuential within the academic circle since the mid 1970s, and
eventually took hold, is the Ricardian equivalence. In Barro’s neoclassical ivory tower of
rational expectations, perfect and eﬃcient capital markets with no liquidity constraints,
with the future path of government spending ﬁxed and known to the economic agents
who adhere to a permanent income hypothesis and to a life-cycle model of savings, any
attempts by the state to stimulate aggregate demand by increasing debt-ﬁnanced gov-
ernment spending will have no net eﬀect.35 In his review of the literature, Seater (1993,
proﬁts + (wages, salaries) + taxes =  +  +  +(  − ) ⇒
proﬁts + (wages, salaries) −  =  +  − taxes +(  − ),o r
 =  +  − taxes +(  − )
where  is consumption,  denotes savings,  is private investment,  is government spending,  is
exports and  denotes imports. The core of the balance sheet debate (private versus public stimuli for
growth) can be captured neatly after a ﬁnal rearrangement of the above identity:
 −  =(  − )+(  − ),i . e .
net savings = budget deﬁcit + export surplus
Note that in a monetary union, where a member state cannot devalue to boost its exports and put
a brake on its imports, a current account deﬁcit can be compensated by private sector investment or
government budget deﬁcits. That is, when ( − 0) the private sector has to invest more than it
saves ( − 0) or the public sector has to increase its spending ( − 0) to balance the country’s
national accounts. In case of a balanced current account, budget deﬁcits reﬂect private sector surpluses.
34To use the term of Martin Wolf in the Financial Times, October 19, 2011, ‘There is no sunlit future
for the euro’.
35In particular, Barro (1974, p.1116) argued that “there is no persuasive theoretical case for treating
government debt, at the margin, as a net component of perceived household wealth. ... in the case where
the marginal net-wealth eﬀect of government bonds is close to zero ... ﬁscal eﬀects involving changes in
the relative amounts of tax and debt ﬁnance for a given amount of public expenditure would have no eﬀect
on aggregate demand, interest rates, and capital formation.” As Feldstein (1976, p.332) points out “A
32p.143) found that two conclusions were clear: “The ﬁrst appears uncontroversial: it seems
almost impossible that Ricardian equivalence holds exactly. ...The second conclusion is
far more controversial: despite its nearly certain invalidity as a literal description of the
role of public debt in the economy, Ricardian equivalence holds as a close approximation.”
In the context of Warrant Economics though and in the midst of the worst crisis of
post-WWII capitalism, we ponder: Is a redistribution of income through intergenerational
transfers that aim to smooth future tax hikes, that will be necessary to pay oﬀ the current
debt bonanza (the thrust of Barro’s syllogism), a viable possibility or a pervasive fallacy?
We ﬁnd ourselves asking the ominous question:
• A squeezed bottom 90% of the income distribution - undergoing a long real wage
stagnation, staring at weak labour and housing markets (the US is experiencing a
record rate of mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures), living under a credit crunch,
and loaded with record levels of debt bequeathed by the unprecedented securitization
of inequality (see Section 2) - can it ever realistically produce the level of net savings
required to neutralise the wealth eﬀect of short-term sovereign debt expansion?
The top decile may aﬀord to practice their duty for intergenerational altruism that the
Ricardian equivalence theory prescribes, surely not the bottom 90% peasantry. Once
more, the voodoo abstractions of the neoclassical drivel abstain from income distribution
issues and silence the life-cycle impoverishment of the middle class. Once again, the
rational forward-looking actions of the omnipotent and omnipresent representative agent,
f e e d e d( w es p e c u l a t e )b yw h a te l s ec o u l di tb eb u t‘ h e l i c o p t e rm o n e y ’ ,w i l lv a l i d a t et h e
irrefutable "theory" that nulliﬁes futile government debt and spending on social security:
“...my conclusion is that government debt (and social security) will not add to net wealth
in a model with operative intergenerational transfers (either from old to young or from
young to old)” (Barro, 1976, p.343). In that vein, Lucas dismissed the recent $800 billion
worth ﬁscal stimuli plan in the US as ‘schlock economics’ and his Chicago colleague John
Cochrane argued that its rationale is based on discredited "fairy tales". (See Krugman,
2009.)
Scholars though may reﬂect on our economic heritage; in his autobiography, Robbins
(1971) regards his dispute with Keynes on the ﬁscal expansion issue during the Great
Depression “as the greatest mistake of my professional career” (ib., p.154). Thinking back
on his anti-expansionary perspective he confesses: “How had I got myself into this state of
novel feature of Barro’s model is that each individual’s utility depends not only on his own consumption
but also on the utility of his immediate heir. The utility of the current generation therefore depends
indirectly on the utility of all future generations. The introduction of government debt creates wealth
for the current generation but a liability for a future generation or generations. The current generation
will resist this redistribution from their heirs to themselves by increasing their bequests by just enough
so that their heirs are no worse oﬀ. The extra saving for this additional bequest just oﬀsets the reduced
savings that would otherwise be associated with the government debt.”
33mind? ...the trouble was intellectual. I had become the slave of theoretical constructions
which, if not intrinsically invalid as regards logical consistency, were inappropriate to the
total situation which had then developed and which therefore misled my judgement” (ib.,
p.153).
Such introspection and mea culpa though are grotesquely absent from the mindset
of the PPA partnership in addressing the deeper causes of the ongoing Great Recession.
Friedman’s (in)famous dictum that the Great Depression was a mere monetary phenom-
enon, and his disquisition that the onus is on the US Federal Reserve to have prevented it
by boosting the supply of base money, are still shaping the magna carta of core macroeco-
nomic policy making. In dealing with our economic doldrums, expansionary ﬁscal policy
is, on the top of the contested Ricardian equivalence, decried as a liability in crowding
out the potency of the private sector. A delusive marketopian spell that feeds the ne-
oliberal envision that public cutbacks and ﬁscal shutdown will automatically spur private
investment.
In turn, we are told to believe in optical illusions: the recapitalised banks - at whatever
bill the wider society is having to foot for their solvency - will eventually, through the
mechanism of fractional reserve banking and the money multiplier, boost (via lending)
economic growth, employment, and prosperity. Instead, and contrary to the patronising
of policy makers’ theorising, the Put’s beneﬁts from the plethora of state-funded capital
injections in the forms of troubled asset relief program (TARP), quantitative easing,
implicit or explicit guarantees of their toxic assets (mortgages in the US, sovereign assets
in the Eurozone) are being amassed in the coﬀers of the banking industry. Its gumption
is the continuing pursuit of bumper proﬁts that could mimick the "party" era of the
ﬁfty times (50x) multiple by which a bank’s equity was typically leveraged in 2007 - at
the heights of the virulent shadow banking and the apogee of the silent securitisation
of inequality (see Section 2) - generating Returns on Equity (ROE)36 of up to 25%-30%
(ﬁve times the norm for many blue-chip industrial companies), and artiﬁcially boosting
executive pay.
Nowadays, leverage ratios are down to around 20x, the shabby building blocks of
their proﬁtability are exposed, manipulable risk-weighting internal systems that allow the
buildup of systemic risks are questioned, and more equity is demanded by regulators to
fund bank assets (nothing close to the order of 40% equity required to fund the asset base
during the 19th century). The assemblage of bank responses to the request of taking some
responsibility for their own follies during the bygone heydays, and, more importantly, the
lack of trust between them (one has only to look at recent LIBOR rates that are heading
towards the 2008 levels) materialises in the threat of accelerating hoarding and internal
36The banks’ own preferred measure which has historically ﬂattered performance by relating returns
only to thin equity cushions, rather than Returns on Assets (ROA) which takes into account the toxicity
of their complex loan portfolio and the consequences of unscrupulous lending.
34recapitalisation through a loan shutdown; temporarily suspending dividends and slashing
bonuses are alien to their lexicon.
So we are left to ponder once more: are we witnessing another fallacy of composition?
Banks are deleveraging to salvage their existence and avert nationalisations, the public
sector through self-inﬂicted, ideologically grounded austerity agendas is deleveraging, the
bottom 99% of households are confronting a real purchasing power regression. However
camouﬂaged the lack of aggregate demand is, the burning question is still looming large:
where will sustainable and equitable growth (not a repeat of the debt-fueled kind of
pre-2007) will originate from? For the western countries that issue their own currency,
devaluations could in principle restore competitiveness; however, this is a zero sum game
if each country follows such recourse at the same time. Shouts to surplus countries, e.g.
the BRICs and their Eurozone equivalent (e.g. Germany), to boost their own domestic
demand to facilitate net exports of troubleshoot economies are in vein.
For the Eurozone periphery, stalemated in a sovereign debt peril, loaded with struc-
t u r a le x t e r n a ld e ﬁcits, internal price devaluation is the only option; but in the light of the
extinction of competition by SMEs, that could lower prices, and the dominance of mo-
nopolistic/monopsonistic price setters, internal deﬂation becomes synonymous to punitive
wage deﬂation and impoverishment of the vast majorities. Explicit ﬁscal transfers from
surplus nations, stimulatory policies in the core, ECB acting as the unlimited lender of
last resort for sovereigns whose access to febrile bond markets is banned, and aggres-
sive monetary easing (not fueling further rounds of destabilising ﬁnancial speculation)
are an anathema to the European elites. What else stands out to kick start "recovery"?
Large corporations siting on a pile of idle cash, amashed by the concentration of economic
surplus facilitated by the Warrant Economics synergies, waiting to pump it into new in-
vestment. Will it be socially beneﬁcial on a wide scale, or a further step towards their
dominance and unfettered proﬁteering? Our solicitous view is that an economy cannot
be saved by the incubators of its malaises.
356 Conclusions
Our thesis on Warrant Economics unravels a power mode of insiders’ capitalism of the last
thirty years that through the costless appropriation of an intricate cobweb of institutional
Call-Put policy options has had a twofold inﬂuence. First, it has distorted competition in
the market system and accelerated economic concentration, thus commissioning rivalry
predominantly among big corporations with a global reach. Second, it has entitled the
free-market aristocracy of the top 1% of the income distribution to sail safely in the
storming waters of the Great Recession, preserving their soaring remuneration. We argue
that adverse concentration and income eﬀects constitute the two sides of the Warrant
Economics coin.
Central in the many-layered tapestry of Warrant Economics are its two symbiotic
elements: (i) the systemic creation and preservation of inequality via Call-Put endow-
ments, and (ii) the systemic exploitation of inequality via novel and toxic forms of se-
curitisation. We further attest to the major destabilising consequence of (Call) policies
manifested by the falling share of wages and salaries in a country’s GDP and the accom-
panying increase in proﬁts, a phenomenon that fueled the epidemic of mounting consumer
debt.
We identify a puissant private-public-academic partnership prescribing the neolib-
eral dogmas of small-state government, low-tax economy (embedding huge tax cuts for
the wealthy), and minimum regulation for big businesses. A PPA project fervourously
preaching that outcomes generated by "free" markets are optimal and eﬃcient, the ra-
tional results of "natural" economic forces that self-regulate and equilibrate themselves.
Portraying economics as the analogue of the "physics of society", a fallacious and de-
generating research programme in our opinion, serenaded an aura of infallibility for their
wisdom.
In eﬀect, the Warrant Economics form of market fundamentalism that capitalism has
evolved into is meticulously concealed by the PPA elites: corporate excesses are pardoned;
the ability of the unchecked rampant ﬁnancial system to generate systemic crises (explored
by Minsky, 1977, through his ﬁnancial instability hypothesis), and the ensuing mismatch
between public risk and private reward are excised from their analyses; and the social
fabric torn asunder is justiﬁed by lauding greed as an economic virtue.
In this faculty of thought, we argued that the ever unfolding crisis is not an unpre-
dictable, low probability event but, rather, the "natural" symptom of the hubristic and
intrinsically unstable market system of Warrant Economics destined to be exposed and
challenged.
The tremors of the Great Recession preclude us from keep having our ‘Eyes Wide
Shut’ to the fact that “Among us today a concentration of private power without equal
36in history is growing. This concentration is seriously impairing the economic eﬀectiveness
of private enterprise as a way of providing employment for labor and capital and as a
way of assuring a more equitable distribution of income and earnings among the people
of the nation as a whole.” Remarkably, this was the message to the US Congress on the
Concentration of Economic Power by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938, April 29.37
In the context of our work it is illuminating to read, four years prior to the above
message: “Capitalism seems to retain remarkable vitality; but it can hardly survive the
political rigors of another depression; and banking, with the able assistance of monopoly,
seems certain to give us both bigger and better depressions hereafter—unless the state does
reassume and discharge with some wisdom its responsibility for controlling the circulating
medium” (Simons, [1934]1948, p.56). After more than seventy years from Roosevelt’s and
Simon’s misgivings, the neoliberal dogma having bulldozed liberal economic thinking and
seized its academic estate has developed a strong grasp in policy making.
Income distribution and inequality have been sidelined in mainstream economic the-
orising and policy design under the auspices of the meritocratic position of a one-to-one
relationship between wages and productivity in the long run. Snapshot inequality is cur-
sory received by the custodians of our dysfunctional market system under the illusive
proviso that there is social mobility within lifetimes and across generations; after all capi-
talism has never been an equitable system the argument goes. Warrant Economics unveils
the fallacy of the productivity-reward dictum, and lays the groundwork for comprehend-
ing the unprecedented (in post-WWII democratic states) concentration of the ‘wealth of
nations’ in the top 1%. Concurrently, with the uncovering of the function of Call-Put syn-
ergies the adage ‘living above our means’, used by administrations (either preemptively
or trapped in the sovereign debt crisis) to justify the draconian austerity measures and
assault on the welfare system and indirect wage, becomes the insult after the injury to
the bottom 99 percent of their citizens.
Addressing the malaises of capitalism of the last 30 years one has to confront the
inner foundations and representations of the twisted market system that we perused in
our work and, ideally abrogate, realistically mitigate, the Call-Put distortions that have
become the "thing-in-itself" of the modern, knowledgeable society.
As the crisis intensiﬁes and public outrage gathers momentum it is being argued by
many (e.g. Stiglitz, 2010) that a new economic paradigm is needed. For Kuhn (1962),
crisis, the common awareness that something has gone wrong, is the usual prelude for a
paradigm shift. A new economic paradigm will develop as long as one alienates herself
from the rhetoric of the incumbent and understands how the economic system is function-
ing in its current form. We rest our case with the conviction that the thesis on Warrant
Economics serves this noble purpose.
37http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12058.htm
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